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I. À LA PLACE DE LA RÉVOLUTION 
The first scene always includes a shot of the corpus delicti. And it is the first 
scene, quite irrespective of where it appears in the sequence. Of course, the face is 
not always depicted, the head not always beheld as Macbeth’s before the curtain, 
or Louis XVI’s before the throng in what theretofore had been La Place Louis 
XV. Indeed, the body need not be that of a noble, need not be real, need not even 
be an immediately identifiable individual, though identity is always put in question 
by the scene, always assigned. Our gaze may be carried up from a trail of blood, a 
limb out of joint, or down the bloodied wall of a room that could be our own; it 
may be fixed photographically, trained on the ghastly appearance of an entire 
corpse in situ, hanging distended from a tree, or burning in effigy; it may pan 
down slowly, forensically, from a mound of freshly dug soil to the familiar hole, 
empty or full, but in either case far too massive and misshapen for a single grave; 
finally, it may be made to linger on the trace of the body removed. And even when 
both body and trace are missing, the first scene will be haunted by that absence, as 
by the ghost in Hamlet, or suspended as a scene of redemptive death to come for 
which we are invited to wait, and to long. At the limit of suspension, the 
redemptive death we await, the one for which we are enjoined proleptically to 
long, is none other than our own. 
This first scene—not the murder itself, but the scene of death—marks the 
 
* Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. I am grateful to Christopher Tomlins, Robert 
Gordon, Ariela Gross, Amalia Kessler, Dan Edelstein, Ian Haney Lopez, Hilary Schor, Nomi 
Stolzenberg, Kurt Shaw, and the participants and commentators at the UC Irvine School of Law 
“‘Law As . . .’: Theory and Method in Legal History” symposium (Apr. 16–17, 2010). 
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appearance of the resistant subject. The distinctive feature of the first scene and its 
repeated representations is that the death it calls to mind cannot be ascribed to 
fate, the will of God, or the necessities of any state of nature. Nothing about 
replacing the guillotine at La Place de la Concorde with the obscure obelisk from 
the Luxor Temple in 1836 concealed the human agency behind Louis XVI’s 
decapitation and the prior destruction of the statue honoring his grandfather à La 
Place de la Révolution. Though the hieroglyphs engraved on the obelisk honoring 
Amun-Ra and the long reign of the pharaoh Rameses II (whose body now 
remains on display, preserved intactus, at the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities) 
surely tempt us to forget the scene of death and the terrible responsibility which 
belong to us alone.1 
We recall this first scene, rewrite it, bowdlerize it, substitute it, dream it, and 
above all, try to forget it over and over, not only to condemn, to contain, and, as 
the case may be, to inspire revolutionary and counter-revolutionary acts of 
resistance, but to mediate countless more mundane, bloodless repetitions of 
resistance, lawful and otherwise. It is the scene of resistance. Memory, history, and 
law are constantly engaged not only to justify our imagination of this scene, but to 
end it, and to eliminate the evidence of it. The scene of the dead sovereign, which 
in modernity is always also the scene of the dead self, not only marks the 
appearance of the resistant subject, but frames that subject’s historical 
consciousness. 
II. A “REVOLUTION IN KNOWLEDGE WORTHY OF THE NAME OF COPERNICUS”2 
It may seem strange to speak of the “historical consciousness” of the 
resistant subject. After all, Freud’s resistant subject is defined by a certain 
mnemonic incapacity. Resistance, Freud explains in The Interpretation of Dreams, is a 
kind of censor that relies upon transference, displacement, inversion, 
overdetermination, etc., to conceal unconscious dream-thoughts in dream-
content.3 And resistance induces the betrayal of memory, producing not only 
“fragmentary,” but “positively inaccurate and falsified”4 waking memories of what 
we have dreamed.5 “Doubt whether a dream or certain of its details have been 
 
1. See MUSÉE CARNAVALET, DE LA PLACE LOUIS XV À LA PLACE DE LA CONCORDE 112–
17 (1982); SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 668–71, 674, 
748–50 (1989); ROBERT SOLÉ, LE GRAND VOYAGE DE L’OBÉLISQUE (2004). The obelisk’s original 
cap was stolen in the sixth century B.C.; the current gold cap was installed by the French in 1998 to 
mark the visit of the now deposed President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak. See id. at 239. 
2. JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS: A SELECTION 114 (Alan Sheridan trans., Tavistock Publications 
1977) [hereinafter A SELECTION]. See also JACQUES LACAN, ÉCRITS 334 (Bruce Fink trans., W.W. 
Norton & Co. 2006) [hereinafter ÉCRITS]. 
3. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS 174–75, 340–46 (James Strackey 
ed. & trans., Avon Books 1965) (1990) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS]. 
4. Id. at 550. 
5. See id. at 580–81. 
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correctly reported,” he writes, “is once more a derivative of the dream-censorship, 
of resistance to the penetration of the dream-thoughts into consciousness. This 
resistance has not been exhausted even by the displacements and substitutions it 
has brought about; it persists in the form of doubt attaching to the material which 
has been allowed through.”6 The resistant subject not only suffers bouts of 
amnesia, forgets what was dreamt altogether, but doubts even what she does 
remember. 
At least in Freud’s early writing, the subject must be made to remember. The 
work of analysis consists in opening the subject’s access to the historical 
consciousness resistance refuses. As Lacan explains, “the condition of the 
continuity in the anamnesis, by which Freud measures the completeness of the 
cure . . . is not a question of biological memory, nor of its intuitionist 
mystification, nor of the paramnesia of the symptom, but of remembering, that is, of 
history.”7 This suggests that resistance must be overcome in order to address the 
subject’s symptoms. Tellingly though, it is resistance itself that offers the analyst a 
way in. So it would be more accurate to say that resistance must be addressed in 
order to overcome the subject’s symptoms.8 
As we already know . . . a complete reversal of all psychical values takes 
place between the dream-thoughts and the dream. . . . If, then, an 
indistinct element of a dream’s content is in addition attacked by doubt, 
we have a sure indication that we are dealing with a comparatively direct 
derivative of one of the proscribed dream-thoughts. The state of things is 
what it was after some sweeping revolution in one of the republics of 
antiquity or the Renaissance. The noble and powerful families which had 
previously dominated the scene were sent into exile and all the high 
offices were filled by newcomers. Only the most impoverished and 
powerless members of the vanquished families, or their remote 
dependents, were allowed to remain in the city; and even so they did not 
enjoy full civic rights and were viewed with distrust. The distrust in this 
analogy corresponds to the doubt in the case we are considering. . . . It is 
precisely the fact that doubt produces this interrupting effect upon an 
 
6. Id. at 554 (citation omitted). See also id. at 555 (“The forgetting of dreams, too, remains 
inexplicable unless the power of the psychical censorship is taken into account.”). 
7. ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 213; see also id. at 217 (“What we teach the subject to recognize as 
his unconscious is his history. . . .”); id. at 215 (discussing analyst’s methodological attention to 
“monuments,” “archival documents,” “semantic evolution,” “traditions,” and “traces”); id. at 335 
(“[T]heir function presupposed history at its very core, their discipline being the one that had 
reconstructed the bridge between modern man and ancient myths.”). 
8. As Lacan puts it, “The resistances themselves . . . are used as long as possible in the 
direction [sens] of the progress of the discourse. And when it is time to put an end to them, we 
manage to do so by giving in to them.” Id. at 249–50. Compare Lacan’s discussion of resistance, 
censorship and law, in JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK II, at 127 
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Sylvana Tomaselli trans., 1988) [hereinafter SEMINARS, BOOK II]. 
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analysis that reveals it as a derivative and tool of psychic resistance. 
Psychoanalysis is justly suspicious. One of its rules is that whatever 
interrupts the progress of analytic work is resistance.9 
Resistance not only lights the path of analysis, following Freud’s striking analogy, 
it appears à la place de la révolution. This scene, the place of liberation now 
haunted by survivors of the ancien régime, is the scene of distrust and self-doubt 
that cannot be avoided. Is it possible to approach L’Obélisque de Louxor and its 
hieroglyphs à La Place de la Concorde free of confusion, doubt, uncertainty? Is it 
possible to avoid imagining the guillotine? The missing head? The following 
terror?10 
The problem for the resistant subject is not, then, any mnemonic incapacity, 
but rather that she remembers far too much, wants memory more than anything, 
and is on account of that excess of memory, as Nietzsche well understood, 
obliged to forget.11 The dream work of the resistant subject—her repeated 
displacements, forgetting, confusion, and doubt—is itself a kind of memory work, 
memory working, reaching for consciousness, simultaneously reconstructing and 
quailing at falsifications of the first scene. Analysis does not confer historical 
consciousness on this view. Rather, analysis is possible only because the resistant 
subject is already entrenched in historical consciousness, already remembering, 
already overwhelmed by memory. 
This is to state what Lacan insisted was a Copernican revolution in Freud’s 
theory of psychoanalysis. If resistance cannot be overcome, if the internal division 
resistance reveals is irreducible, if we cannot, as Freud admits, pierce what he 
called “the dream’s navel,”12 analysis may mitigate certain symptoms, but the 
specific historical consciousness underlying both the Enlightenment and the 
Reformation is undone. A project whose trajectory is self-mastery leads to the 
paradoxical discovery that “man is a decentered subject,”13 that the subject no 
 
9. INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS, supra note 3, at 554–55. 
10. A parallel set of questions could of course be posed regarding the history of the American 
Revolution and ex post resistance running to civil war and touching upon the most basic 
constitutional failure of the nation (failure based on an illicit division, it should go without saying, in 
the very constitution of legal subjects). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.1; 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. Is it possible, we might ask, to approach the Constitution free of doubt, 
confusion, distrust, and uncertainty? Do the Reconstruction Amendments, ratified under the 
politically and legally strained circumstances prevailing after the Civil War, resolve or deepen those 
doubts? Do they redeem the liberal subject or mark the liberal subject as already dead? See Norman 
W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument : Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective 
Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003). On the terror in France, see SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A 
CHRONICLE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, ch. 17 (1989); DAN EDELSTEIN, THE TERROR OF 
NATURAL RIGHT (2009). 
11. See generally FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
HISTORY FOR LIFE (Peter Preuss trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1874). 
12. INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS, supra note 3, at 564. 
13. SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 47. See ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 355 (“[I]t is in the 
disintegration of the imaginary unity constituted by the ego that the subject finds the signifying 
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more revolves about the ego than the sun and solar system about the earth. 
Just to start raising the question as to what the ego is requires one to 
detach oneself from what we might call the religious conception of 
consciousness. Implicitly, modern man thinks that everything which has 
happened in the universe since its origin came about so as to converge on 
this thing which thinks . . . unique, precious being, pinnacle of creation, 
which is himself, with this privileged vantage-point called consciousness. 
This perspective leads to an anthropomorphism which is so deluded that 
one has to start by shedding the scales from one’s eyes, so as to realize 
what kind of illusion one has fallen prey to.14 
But detachment from this religious conception of consciousness underlying the 
Enlightenment project is itself resisted. We want self-mastery. So as soon as the 
scales are shed, both subject and analyst are predisposed to forget precisely what has 
been revealed. In his later work, “Freud chose to remind us that the unconscious 
as such cannot be reached and makes itself known in a fashion which is 
paradoxical, painful, and cannot be reduced to the pleasure principle. He thus 
brings back into the foreground the essence of his discovery, which we tend to 
forget.”15 It is not enough to disassemble the guillotine or rename the scene—we 
substitute hieroglyphs in their place, inviting amnesia. Anything to avoid Freud’s 
discovery of decentered, resistant subjects and the death instinct in the seemingly 
inexhaustible repetition of traumatic experience. Anything à la place de la 
révolution. 
III. AVOIDING RESISTANCE 
This is the position not only of the resistant subject and her analyst, but of 
 
material of his symptoms.”). This is what Lacan calls Freud’s “revolution in knowledge worthy of the 
name of Copernicus.” A SELECTION, supra note 2, at 114. 
14. SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 47–48. See ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 250 (“But you 
cannot possibly [understand the meaning of the subject’s discourse] if you cleave to the idea that the 
subject’s ego is identical to the presence that is speaking to you.”). 
15. SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 65 (emphasis added). Freud’s theory, Lacan 
elsewhere writes, 
constitutes an objection to any reference to totality in the individual, since the subject 
introduces division therein, as well as in the collectivity that is the equivalent of the 
individual. Psychoanalysis is what clearly relegates both the one and the other to the status of mirages. 
This would seem to be something that could no longer be forgotten, were it not precisely psychoanalysis that 
teaches us that it is forgettable—confirmation of which turns out . . . to come from 
psychoanalysts themselves, their ‘new tendencies’ representing this forgetting. 
ÉCRITS, supra note 2, at 242 (emphasis added). Lacan was writing against the tradition of ego-
psychology. He accused his colleagues of having forgotten the central insights of Freud, most 
fundamentally the linguistic structure of the unconscious—and he was “excommunicated” for it. See 
LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYSCHO-ANALYSIS 1–13 (Alan Sheridan trans., 
1977) [hereinafter FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS]; see also SEMINARS, BOOK II, supra note 8, at 65; 
id. at 228 (“There is only one resistance, the resistance of the analyst. The analyst resists when he 
doesn’t understand what he is dealing with.”). 
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modern political philosophy, legal thought, and, to a certain extent, history. 
Predicated as it is on the myth of consent veiled beyond history in a so-called state 
of nature, modern political philosophy cannot address the resistant subject. 
Revolution and resistance are reduced to exceptional events—aberrations verging 
on the ahistorical and nearly always charged with the terror of anarchy.16 Even 
natural law theorists, in whom one would expect to find some degree of 
insouciance regarding the defiance of law, solemnly burden the “right” of civil 
disobedience with elaborate preconditions no ordinary resistant subject could 
meet.17 
A few contemporary theorists have insisted that political philosophy begin 
from the position of the resistant subject. But they generally seek either to liberate 
the subject from her resistant position (typically by demanding the standard 
accoutrement of liberal subjects), or to abjure the normative dimension of political 
philosophy, shifting to a kind of melancholic documentary mode perfectly 
matched to the malaise of the subordinated identity groups they depict. Resistance 
is represented, alternatingly, as futile, as a merely reactive stance, as everywhere 
and nowhere, or as a form of interpretive action more or less cabined on the 
knowledge side of the power/knowledge circuit.18 We are, in the end, instructed in 
our underlying desire to be punished, our attachment to injury and subjection, and 
the naivety and embarrassing (indeed, totalitarian) implications of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century revolutionary ideologies.19 Politics, the normative dimension of 
which is supposed to inspire public sacrifice, reduces to base forms of self-
sacrifice (docility and suicide, even suicide bombing) or the justification and 
critique of forced sacrifice for others (oppression, exclusion, war, and now 
chillingly plural holocausts). In neither case may the resistant subject apprehend 
 
16. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT (Thomas Cook ed., Hafner Press 1973) (1690); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
363–77 (1971). Not just revolution or resistance, but participation, is diminished by other modern 
political theorists. On Joseph Schumpeter’s reduction of participation to voting and the influence of 
his ideas on Berelson, Dahl, Sartori, and Eckstein, see CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4–13 (1970). 
17. Above all, self-interested resistance is precluded. See HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE 
REPUBLIC (1972); HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION (1965); see also WILLIAM SIMON, THE 
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998). 
18. See JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER (1997); CHARLES MILLS, THE 
RACIAL CONTRACT (1997); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Judith Butler, 
Subjection, Resistance, Resignification: Between Freud and Foucault, in THE IDENTITY IN QUESTION 229–50 
(John Rajchman ed., 1995). On the effort to liberate the subject from her resistant position through 
liberal contract theory, see Charles Mills, The Domination Contract, in CONTRACT & DOMINATION 79–
105 (Carole Pateman & Charles Mills eds., 2007). 
19. See, for example, Wendy Brown’s lacerating discussion of “contemporary political 
projects” directed at “emancipatory political aims,” in STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN 
LATER MODERNITY ix (1995); id. at 7 (noting the manner in which “ideals of freedom . . . emerge to 
vanquish their imagined enemies, but in this move . . . frequently recycle and reinstate rather than 
transform the terms of domination that generated them”). 
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herself as decentered and act.20 
The resistant subject is equally anathema to legal thought. Constitutions 
more or less immediately replace revolutions, citizens (or rather abstractions about 
citizenship) replace resistant subjects, and the rule of law approximates religious 
ritual.21 Obelisk. Hieroglyph. Exegetical obsession. Monumental history. Law a 
civic religion. Lawlessness a breach of faith. There is interminable debate about 
the location of interpretive authority, about whose exegetical work is dispositive 
(judges, lawyers, legislators, executives, citizens), but the methods of interpretation 
(structural, textualist, originalist, purposivist) and the means of asserting 
interpretive authority (political expression, democratically accountable legislative 
action, bureaucratic mediation, and “adversarial legalism”22) remain circumscribed 
within boundaries set by law. 
Popular constitutionalism decentralizes interpretive authority, moving it 
from bench and bar to the citizen subject.23 And it demonstrates quite 
provocatively that ordinary legal processes cannot in fact contain the means of 
asserting interpretive authority. (Most strikingly in the American context, the 
Constitution is regularly “amended” without resort to the process Article V sets 
out, and, when necessary, by raw force.) But the demonstration is riddled with 
anxiety, with a desire to reduce extra-legal means to the legal process, to show that 
irreducibly extra-legal means are nevertheless orderly, or at least oriented toward 
law, and, of course, to avoid the twin spectres of anarchy and tyranny. This anxiety 
is the first clue that even popular constitutionalists are not in fact concerned with 
resistant subjects. Their objective is not to address resistance but rather to affirm 
 
20. Even Bonnie Honig, who turns most promisingly to an agonistic conception of politics 
that does not relegate resistance to a revolutionary founding, who sees the folly in resistance strategies 
that seek merely to expand the rights of liberal subjects, and who is unafraid of “rupture” and of 
“democracy’s self-overcoming,” is reluctant to admit and fully explore the question of agonism 
internal to the subject. BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS (2009); see also WILLIAM 
CONNOLLY, IDENTITY\DIFFERENCE (1991). I am otherwise in deep sympathy with Honig’s account 
of the paradox of politics and most grateful to Christopher Tomlins for pointing out the connection. 
See BROWN, supra note 19, at 21–22 (naming a parallel “paradox” of resistance to power). 
21. See HONIG, supra note 20, at 26–28, 32–33; SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FAITH 11–14 (1988); Joseph Story, Address Delivered Before the Members of the Suffock Bar, in THE LEGAL 
MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 70–71 (Perry Miller ed., 1961). 
22. The term is Robert Kagan’s. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 3–4  
(2001). On the methodological and normative oscillations of American legal thought, see generally 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493–505 
(1996). 
23. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 7–8  (2004); MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS x (1999); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE 21, 91, 272–73 (1991) (describing “dualist” theory of constitutional interpretation and 
amendment); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, Part II passim (2000) 
(discussing historical evidence of “dualist” theory in relation to the constitutional turmoil of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction). 
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the sovereignty of the citizen subject, surtout à la place de la révolution.24 
As psychoanalytic theory suggests, history can address resistance, both 
individual and collective, by taking memory seriously. But historians have come 
late indeed to the question of memory, obsessed as they have been with the 
objective implications of the interdependence of law, history, and national identity. 
Hegel gave the most direct and enduring statement of that interdependence in his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of History: “Only in a State cognizant of laws,” he argued, 
“can distinct transactions take place, accompanied by such a clear consciousness 
of them as supplies the ability and suggests the necessity of an enduring record.”25 
Families and clans have subjective memory, but only the nation-state offers the 
conditions in which history may be written: 
Family memorials, patriarchal traditions, have an interest confined to the 
family and the clan. The uniform course of events which such a condition 
implies, is no subject of serious remembrance; though distinct 
transactions or turns of fortune, may rouse Mnemosyne to form 
conceptions of them—in the same way as love and the religious emotions 
provoke imagination to give shape to a previously formless impulse. But 
it is the State which first presents subject-matter that is not only adapted 
to the prose of History, but involves the production of such history in 
the very progress of its own being.26 
For anyone accustomed to thinking about law and history in terms of the ways in 
which the rule of law (especially the interpretive work of the courts) depends upon 
and reflects certain assumptions about the past, certain historiographic 
conventions, or the ways in which social and political history draw into relief 
contingent developments in the law, the claim that there can be no history without 
law must surely come as something of a surprise. 
But as Hayden White, interpreting Hegel, explains, 
[w]here there is no rule of law, there can be neither a subject nor the kind 
of event that lends itself to narrative representation. . . . [N]arrativity . . . 
presupposes the existence of a legal system against which or on behalf of 
which the typical agents of a narrative account militate. And this raises 
the suspicion that narrative in general, from the folktale to the novel, 
from the annals to the fully realized “history,” has to do with the topics 
of law, legality, legitimacy, or, more generally, authority.27 
 
24. See HONIG, supra note 20, at 23–24 (revealing the Kantian underpinnings of deliberative 
democracy’s hesitant endorsement of popular sovereignty); KRAMER, supra note 23, at 33–35. 
25. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 61 (J. Sibree 
trans., Dover Publications 1956) (1837). 
26. Id. at 60–61. 
27. HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM 12–13 (1987). “If, as Hegel suggests, 
historicality as a distinct mode of human existence is unthinkable without the presupposition of a 
system of law in relation to which a specifically legal subject could be constituted, then historical self-
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History needs the legal subject to “serve as the agent, agency, and subject of 
historical narrative.”28 Moreover, it is simply not possible to narrate events 
without turning to law and moralizing, for “every fully realized story . . . is a kind 
of allegory.”29 To narrate is to “endow[ ] events, whether real or imaginary, with a 
significance that they do not possess as a mere sequence.”30 And “every historical 
narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to moralize the events of 
which it treats.”31 Narrative form works to bridge the gap between events and the 
normative order promised or imagined by law. Historical narrative, specifically, 
targets the real, “makes the real desirable, makes the real into an object of desire, 
and does so by its imposition, upon events that are represented as real, of the 
formal coherency that stories possess.”32 No history without law. 
What then of history when the authority of law is contested, fractured, not 
just to the point of conceptual disagreement, but of social disorder, to the point of 
open resistance, revolution, fratricidal violence, constitutional failure? And what to 
make of White’s seemingly contradictory thesis that historical discourse only arises 
when more than one account of the real is possible? “In order to qualify as 
historical,” he insists, “an event must be susceptible to at least two narrations of 
its occurrence. Unless at least two versions of the same set of events can be 
imagined, there is no reason for the historian to take upon himself the authority of 
giving the true account of what really happened.”33 
If, as this rather powerfully suggests, resistance is the domain of historical 
discourse, why put history in relation to law at all? White contends that historical 
discourse is intimately, indeed, formally, bound up with the maintenance of legal 
authority—and all the more so when that authority is contested.  
Where there is ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the status of the legal 
system . . . the form in which the subject encounters most immediately 
the social system in which he is enjoined to achieve a full humanity, the 
ground on which any closure of a story one might wish to tell about a 
past, whether it be a public or a private past, is lacking.34  
And it is just such moments of resistance that produce the most anxiety, and, 
concomitantly, the most aggressive narrative efforts to provide the missing closure 
we crave—to mend history, and in so doing, protect, re-establish, or legitimize the 
 
consciousness, the kind of consciousness capable of imagining the need to represent reality as history, 
is conceivable only in terms of its interest in law, legality, and legitimacy, and so on.” Id. at 13–14. 
28. Id. at 13. 
29. Id. at 14. “Where, in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that 
morality or a moralizing impulse is present too.” Id. at 24. “A narrative account is always a figurative 
account, an allegory.” Id. at 48. 
30. Id. at 14. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 21. 
33. Id. at 20. 
34. Id. at 14. 
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system of law that would otherwise be threatened.35 History centers the subject, 
offers order à la place de la révolution.36 
At the limit of the desire for closure and order, Clio surrenders to Nomos. 
History, now firmly in the hands of philosophy, becomes law: Hegel’s dialectic and 
Reason in History;37 Marx’s species-being and economic determinism;38 Comte’s 
positivism and loi des trois états;39 and Spencer’s “Progress: Its Law and its 
Cause.”40 Even sober, post-Hegelian efforts to “discipline” history,41 to 
professionalize the field, remove it from political, and especially utopian, 
imagination, nevertheless surrender it to law, here as a concealed (which is to say, 
objective, neutral, empirically verifiable) plot: 
Insofar as historical stories can be completed, can be given narrative 
closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, they give to reality the 
odor of the ideal. This is why the plot of a historical narrative is always an 
embarrassment and has to be presented as “found” in the events rather 
than put there by narrative techniques.42 
With Lacan, then, we might say that modern historians have had as much trouble 
interrogating their own desire, understanding the sources of their own resistance, 
and understanding the roots of the discipline in resistance, as have analysts.43 They 
have forgotten history’s status as muse, forgotten altogether that Clio is the 
offspring of one of Mnemosyne’s nine nights with Zeus.44 
 
35. See id. at 30. 
36. “[T]his value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a 
desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure, of an image of life that 
is and can only be imaginary. The notion that sequences of real events possess the formal attributes of 
the stories we tell about imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, daydreams, reveries.” 
Id. at 24. 
37. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, REASON IN HISTORY (Robert S. Hartman ed. & 
trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1953). 
38. Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 66 
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
39. AUGUSTE COMTE, DISCOURS SUR L’ESPRIT POSITIF, ch. 1 (1844). 
40. WHITE, supra note 27, at 61–63. 
41. Id. at 61. 
42. Id. at 21; see also id. at 62, 65. 
43. “[W]hat is the analyst’s desire? What must there be in the analyst’s desire for it to operate 
in a correct way? Can this question be left outside the limits of our field, as it is in effect in the 
sciences—the modern sciences of the most assured type—where no one questions himself as to what 
there must be in the desire, for example, of the physicist? There really must be a series of crises for an 
Oppenheimer to question us all as to what there is in the desire that lies at the basis of modern 
physics. . . . In any case, the analyst’s desire can in no way be left outside our question . . . .” FOUR 
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS, supra note 15, at 9–10. 
44. See APOLLODORUS, THE LIBRARY OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 7 (Keith Aldrich trans., 
1975) (by Mnemosyne Zeus had Calliope, Clio, Melpomene, Euterpe, Erato, Terpsichore, Urania, 
Thalia, and Polymia—nine muses of the arts). 
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IV. RESISTANCE “TIME OUT OF MIND” 
White, following Arendt, dates the surrender of history to law, revealingly, 
with the “linkage of history and politics in those ideologies that took shape in the 
wake of the French Revolution.”45 But the entanglement of the two stretches back 
to pre-revolutionary efforts to place law beyond history altogether. As J.G.A. 
Pocock has argued: 
If it is no longer as certain as it once was that the extension of 
monarchical authority and the reception of Roman law went everywhere 
hand in hand, the fact remains that the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries were throughout western Europe a time of collision between 
the authority of kings and local or national privileges, liberties and 
constitutions. Many of these latter were rooted in feudal custom, some 
could even be dimly traced back to the customs of the Germanic invaders 
of the empire, and all were more or less permeated by the essential 
medieval idea of law as a thing ancient, immanent and unmade, proof 
against invasion by human wills because no will had made it. Since there 
was an increasing tendency to claim sovereignty in the full sense for the 
king, it was natural that those who sought to defend threatened privileges 
or liberties should emphasize in return that their rights were rooted in a 
law which no king could invade.46 
Pocock locates the practice first with French jurists and their humanist critique of 
the medieval approach to Roman law during the French Wars of Religion. 
Medieval jurists looked almost exclusively to Roman law and to its accumulated 
interpretive gloss; the humanists rejected the gloss, pressed for return to the 
original text itself, and developed techniques for setting that text in the original 
“context of a reconstructed society.”47 “Inadequate, piecemeal and ad hoc their 
work may have been, but the essentials of the historical method were there and 
were known to be there. In this way the legal humanists came to be          
historians . . . .”48 
But the very obstacles to reconstructing Roman law and society revealed an 
unbridgeable gap between past and present—this notwithstanding the ubiquity of 
Roman law in European society. Undeterred, the French jurists turned the gap 
into a chasm, questioning the authority of the Justinian Code precisely because it 
was ancient law developed for and suited only to its own historical context. As 
Pocock explains, “[i]n the name of a more accurate interpretation, a historical 
interpretation had been formulated; and in the name of historical interpretation, 
 
45. WHITE, supra note 27, at 62. 
46. JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL 
LAW 16 (1987). 
47. Id. at 9–10. 
48. Id. at 10. 
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the relevance of the past to the present was apparently being denied. The moment 
was revolutionary,” not only for the development of modern history as a discipline, a 
decisive break with medieval concepts of unmediated continuity with the past, but 
for its political implications.49 “[T]he tension,” Pocock emphasizes, “could not be 
allowed to endure.”50 
So the humanists turned to feudal custom. The appeal 
from written to customary law is part of a fairly widespread reaction that 
was going on in sixteenth-century juristic thought; and one of the 
attractions of custom was precisely that it offered a means of escape from 
the divorce of past and present threatened by the criticisms of the 
historical school. Because Roman law was written and unchangeable, it 
could be subjected to grammatical analysis and proved to belong to a past 
state of society, but because custom was by its nature unwritten law, the 
usages of the folk interpreted through the mouths of judges, it could be 
argued with some plausibility that it could never become obsolete.51 
Custom also offered resistant subjects a uniquely salient response to monarchical 
authority, inviting repeated appeals “to ‘the ancient constitution’, [sic] of seeking 
to prove that the rights it was desired to defend were immemorial and therefore 
beyond the king’s power to alter or annul.”52 
Sir Edward Coke, who represents the apotheosis of the political turn in the 
humanist critique, situates law quite literally beyond history, “in the memory of the 
people.”53 A custom “doth never become a Law to bind the people, until [sic] it 
hath been tried and approved time out of mind.”54 This concept of law and the 
ideas of obligation following from it (“no man ought to take it on himself to be 
wiser than the laws”55) would of course deeply influence Burke’s conservative 
response to the French Revolution, and Pocock is at pains to demonstrate the 
historical inaccuracy of the thesis as well as the strategic limitations it contained 
and the resistance it provoked in political philosophers responsible for the 
development of social contract theory.56 But in seventeenth-century England it 
offered a way around the overdetermination of the Norman Conquest57—what 
 
49. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 14–15. 
52. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 16. “[A] truly immemorial constitution could not be subject to 
a sovereign; since a king could not be known to have founded it originally, the king now reigning 
could not claim to revoke rights rooted in some ancestor’s will.” Id. at 51. See also MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1975–
1976, at 72 (1997). 
53. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 33. 
54. Id. at 33. 
55. Id. at  35. 
56. Id. at  51–52, 54–55; id. at 162 (Hobbes); id. at 235–37 (Locke); Foucault, supra note 52, at 
99  (Hobbes); id at 124 (Grotius, Pufendorf). 
57. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 53. 
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Michel Foucault, in a set of lectures on pre-revolutionary historiography, aptly 
calls a “terrible,” uniquely “painful historical” and “difficult juridical category.”58 
The turn to law “time out of mind” also provided leverage to those insisting, 
against the encroachments and usurpations of the king drawn into relief by the 
elaboration of customary rights, that sovereignty rested with parliament.59 Before 
there can be a sovereign citizen subject, or any narrative history of her nation and 
identity, sovereignty itself must be decentered—Louis XV’s statue must be torn 
from its pedestal before the guillotine for his grandson is erected in its place. 
V. COUNTERHISTORY 
Law as memory, as oral, unwritten, folklore; law driven beyond history by 
memory; modern history arriving, with resistant subjects, at the first scene. Pocock 
is fixed on the emergence of modern history from this pre-revolutionary period—
fixed, that is, on resistance to the Whig interpretation of history. But notice that 
the interdependence of law, memory, and history in the conjunction of custom 
and revolutionary politics, however contingent and errant in the period, draws 
history back toward Mnemosyne. It also draws history away from both 
determinism (utopian and otherwise) and the concealed plots of empiricism to the 
struggles of culturally and temporally specific groups. Further, it explicitly 
identifies the desire of resistant subjects for authority in “time out of mind” and, 
to meet that desire, the discipline of law (philosophy, or science, as necessary). 
Perhaps most significantly, it exposes the division, discord, and contradiction at 
the beginning of any attempt to reconstitute the authority of law. Narratives of 
consent always arrive after the first scene to represent and rename, à La Place de la 
Concorde, what was missing beforehand—what has been missing “time out of 
mind.” 
The harder Coke et al. worked to show that the rights of Englishmen rested 
in immemorial custom, the more clear the absence and ambiguity of record 
evidence became, and the more charged and conflicted became debate about the 
Norman Conquest. The harder François Hotman and other French jurists worked 
to ground French national identity and constitutional authority in the invasion of 
Gaul by the Franks and the primordial nature of their customs, the more clear and 
paradoxical the fact of Roman Conquest (and imperium) became.60 In both cases, 
Foucault contends, establishing “that it is no longer possible to recite a lesson in 
public right whose function is to guarantee the uninterrupted nature of the 
genealogy of kings and their power,” presented “the problem of what Étienne 
Pasquier, who was one of Hotman’s followers, calls ‘the other succession,’ or in 
 
58. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 110. 
59. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 46, 49; see also FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 72. 
60. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 15. The parallels are not exact (the breadth of English common 
law made claims of custom resting in time immemorial more salient than in countries more strictly 
committed to the Justinian Code). 
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other words . . . [w]hat happens . . . when States do not succeed one another as [a 
result of] a sort of continuity that nothing interrupts . . . ?”61 What happens, that 
is, when history exposes the genesis of sovereignty in “contingency and [the] 
injustice of battles”?62 
Hotman would be followed by the nobiliary reaction of Boulainvilliers, by 
the “bourgeois revolutionary project,” and, of course, all the while, by royalist 
retrenchment.63 Pocock traces a related arc in the historiography of seventeenth-
century England.64 In both cases, the monumental history supporting the crown’s 
claims of absolute sovereignty was gradually disassembled. We could say then, 
with Pocock, that this was the “first great age of modern historiography,”65 and 
that surely would be correct. But Foucault’s use of the term “counterhistory”66 
better captures the “inevitably partisan”67 purposes of the resistant subjects 
responsible for these histories and the structures of resistance in which they 
emerged: 
The idea of revolution, which runs through the entire political workings 
of the West and the entire history of the West for more than two 
hundred years, and whose origins and content are still, as it happens, very 
enigmatic, cannot, in my view, be dissociated from the emergence and 
existence of this practice of counterhistory. After all, what could the 
revolutionary project and the revolutionary idea possibly mean without 
this preliminary interpretation of the dissymmetries, the disequilibriums, 
the injustice, and the violence that function despite the order of laws, 
beneath the order of laws, and through and because of the order of 
laws?68 
Counterhistory à la place de la concorde—before the L’Obélisque de Louxor, 
before and as a condition of modern historiography, before and as a condition of 
revolution. Counterhistory, moreover, revealing origins marked by conflict 
 
61. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 119. 
62. Id. at 72. 
63. Id. at 136. With respect to royalist efforts to recolonize history, Foucault points in 
particular to the establishment in 1781 of the “Bibliothèque de législation—note the terms carefully—
d’administration, histoire et droit public”—a “ministry of history” made by merging the Dépot de 
chartes and the Bibliothèque de finances. Id. at 137. 
64. From Coke to Spelman, to Hale, Filmer, Brady, and Burke. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 107, 
120–23 (Spelman); id. at 170–81 (Hale); id. at 182–228 (Filmer, Brady); id. at 243 (Burke). 
65. Id. at 245. 
66. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 72. 
67. POCOCK, supra note 46, at 245. 
68. FOUCAULT, supra note 52, at 78–79. Counterhistory is endorsed more or less explicitly in 
Wendy Brown’s argument for “genealogical politics,” WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY 
96–134 (2001), and implicitly in Honig’s deconstruction of the standard temporal dimensions of 
liberal political consciousness and her call for a “(counter)politics” attentive to “remainders.” HONIG, 
supra note 20, at 141. See also id. at 10 (“[E]mergencies in the real world have a history, and one of the 
requirements of political integrity . . . is surely the need to own up to our implication in the histories 
by which we, at any particular moment, may feel . . . assaulted”); id. at 15, 19. 
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running time out of mind—origins that cannot be reduced to any concorde. 
Resistant origins. 
How else are we to address resistant subjects—subjects constituted only in 
scenes that might have been otherwise? And how else are resistant subjects 
themselves to address the order of laws? 
Yet in legal history, American legal history in any event, resistance, its 
histories and historiography remain opaque. This is due in no small part to the fact 
that the field has oscillated between a profound attachment to the rule of law—or 
rather attachment to ideas about the rule of law which themselves oscillate 
between reducing resistance to mere lawlessness and catching it up almost 
immediately in reassuring narratives of legal reform—and attachment to narratives 
of legal subordination in which resistance is represented either as heroic or tragic. 
In neither case, it must be said, is the centered legal subject placed in doubt. We 
are, in short, repeatedly tempted by our attachment to law to forget that resistance 
is not something to be overcome, but rather the point of entry for modern history. 
And we either blink at the underlying structures of resistance that shape American 
law (most concretely the adversary system and its thoroughgoing dependence on 
narrative representation, decentralized access to counsel, federalism, and 
separation of powers), or we fail to recognize and interpret the operation of these 
structures as structures of resistance. 
Hegel was not wrong—no history without law. But from the perspective of 
counterhistory, law must be detached from the desire for order and studied as a 
site of resistance. We cannot save the centered subject. She lies before us, in the 
first scene. 
 
  
